Marek v. Lawrence Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 38827 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-18-2011
Marek v. Lawrence Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38827
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Marek v. Lawrence Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38827" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3317.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3317
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FRANK MAREK and GAYLE MAREK, ) 
) 
Appellants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
EARL LA WREN CE and SANDRA ) 
LAWRENCE, ) 
) 
Respondents. ) 
---------------) 
Supreme Court No. 38827 
RESPONDENTS'BRIEF 
a 
Appealed from the district Court of the Second Judicial District in the State ofldaho 
In and For the County of Clearwater 
The Honorable Michael J. Griffin, District Judge Presiding 
Counsel for Appellants 
Paul Thomas Clark 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Counsel for Respondents 
Mark S. Snyder 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 626 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FRANK MAREK and GAYLE MAREK, ) 
) 
Appellants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
EARL LAWRENCE and SANDRA ) 
LAWRENCE, ) 
) 
Respondents. ) 
----------~----- ) 
Supreme Court No. 38827 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Appealed from lhe districl Court of the Second Judicial District in the State ofldaho 
In and For the County of Clearwater 
The Honorable Michael J. Griffin, District Judge Presiding 
Counsel for Appellants 
Paul Thomas Clark 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Counsel for Respondents 
Mark S. Snyder 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 626 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTI-JORITIES/STATUTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE ........................................... 1 
IL COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS ....................................... 1 
Ill. SUMMARY OFF ACTS ............................................ 3 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................... 6 
V. ISSUE ON APPEAL ............................................... 7 
VI.. ARGUMENT ..................................................... 8 
A. Deed Construction/Mutual Mistake ...................... 8 
B. Boundary by Agreement ................................ 9 
VIL CONCLUSION .................................................. 11 
- 1 -
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES: 
Callies v. O'Neal, 147 ldaho 841,216 P.3d 130 (Idaho 2009) ........................... 7 
Allen v. Boydstun, 111 Idaho 188, 722 P.2d 497 (ldaho App. 1986) ....................... 9 
Bailey v. E\ving, 105 ldaho 636,671 P.2d 1099 (Jdaho App. 1983) ........................ 9 
Trappett v. Davis, 102 ldaho 527,532,633 P.2d 592,597 (1981) ....................... 10 
Morrissey v. Haley, 124 Idaho 870,873,865 P.2d 961,965 (Idaho 1993) ................. 10 
Griffel v. Reynolds, 136 ldaho 397, 34 P.3d 1080 (Idaho 2001) ......................... 10 
Haney v. Molko, 123 Idaho 132, 844 P.2d 1382 (Ct.App.1992) ......................... 11 
Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441, 690 P.2d 896 (Idaho 1984) ........................... 12 
STATUTES: 
IC§ 12-121 ................................................................ 7, 13 
- 11 -
I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case presents a boundary line dispute between owners of fann land in Clearwater 
County, Idaho. The plaintiffs (Mareks) recently had the disputed boundary surveyed ru1d the 
result was a line significantly east of where their neighbors; the defendants (Lawrences) 
understood the line to be---cutting off a section of ground they had cultivated for several decades. 
The boundary in dispute (the south 1/4 of the section line between Section 26 and Section 27, 
Township 38N, Rangel W, B.M.) was created when R.C. Johnson, a prior common owner of 
both Marcks' and Lawrences' parcels as a contiguous tract, divided the property with a Warranty 
Deed he prepared himself. The legal description of the property he conveyed to Marcks' 
predecessor, Laura Adamson (Gayle Marek's mother); an approximately 20 acre parcel in said 
Section 26, was interpreted by the Court below to state the location of the intended boundary 
line, which contro lied regardless of the surveyed location of the Section line. 
II. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The original complaint was filed by the Mareks against the Lawrenccs to seek declaration 
of two separate common boundaries between the parties, referred to by them as the "Secti'on 27" 
dispute and the "Three Bear Road" dispute. Complaint, R pp. 177-179, p. 4, L. 1-p. 6, L. 14. 
After an evidentiary hearing on a motion for preliminary injunction the court ruled in 
favor of the Lawrences as to the location of the "Section 27° boundary line; consistent with a 
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long existing fence line and ordered the Mareks' to replace the old fence pending final resolution. 
Thereafter in the proceedings, the Mareks' asserted only their claim to the Three Bear Road 
surveyed boundary line~that is ownership of property up to that line. 
The Lawrences filed a motion for summary judgment on its claim of adverse possession 
and boundary by agreement. Judge Bradbury denied the motion, ruling there was no adverse 
possession after finding occupation by the Lawrences was not "open, notorious and hostile" 
because the parties either preswned the line of occupation by the Lawrences was the true 
boundary line or there was a boundary line agreement between the predecessors to the parties. 
Memorandum Decision and Order dated May 27, 2009, R 154-159. 
The Lawrences filed a second motion for summary judgment, arguing there was no 
question of fact as to boundary by agreement, resolving the location of the Three Bear Road 
boundary consistent with intent of parties to the agreement; predecessors in interest to the 
Mareks and Lawrences. 
Judge Bradbury denied the second motion for summary judgment after finding questions 
of fact existed as to whether there was an implied boundary by agreement between predecessors 
to the parties. Memorandum Decision and Order dated Sept. 27, 2010, R pp.55-62. On motion 
for reconsideration, Judge Bradbury ruled there was no question of fact as to the location of the 
intended boundary line, which controlled no matter where a survey might place the section line 
between said Sections 26 and 27. Memorandum Decision and Order dated Nov. 22, 2010, R pp. 
26-32. 
Judge Bradbury retired prior to entering judgment pursuant to his order and his successor, 
Judge Griffin entered judgment for the Lawrences, decreeing the location of both disputed 
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boundaries, and awarding litigation costs. The Mareks' have appealed the judgment only as it 
pertains to the Three Bear Road disputed boundary. 
The judgment prepared and entered by Judge Grifiin was an attempt to clearly state the 
boundary intended by R.C. Johnson: "From a point in the center of Three Bear Road on the east-
west running south boundary line of the Lawrences' property described above ... thence north to 
the intersection with the east-west center section line of Section 26, .. .less the easement for Three 
Bear Road.". Amended Judgment, R pp. 18-20. 
III. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
Three near Road was originally named Hays Road and came to be a public highway by 
petition dated May 2, 1889. The road, including the subject section of road, running from the 
south section comer common to Sections 26 and 27 at its southern point, to the 1/4 section corner 
common to Sections 26 and 27 at its northern point, was surveyed by the county surveyor, W.R. 
Bell and the survey was made part of the petition. The Bell survey plat shows the road running 
north from the south section line on the section line common to Sections 26 and 27 to the 
common north 1/4 corner, where it jogs to the west, then back east to the section line. R p. 123 
(Exhibit A to Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment.) 
However, this was not where the road was built. The road looped we.11 to the west at a 
point just south of the disputed 1/4 comer around a ridge then back to the north/south section line 
north of the disputed corner, where it again proceeded north on or near the section line. 
We know from a comparison of aerial photos; one taken around 1949; the other recently', 
1 Exhibits "A", "B", Affidavit of R.C. Johnson, R pp. 94, 95. 
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along with the affidavits of Clinton Frederickson and R.C. Johnson ( R pp. 89-101), that the road 
was modified near the disputed north 1/4 comer sometime between 1972 and 1974. To 
straighten the north-south running road, it was necessary to drill, blast and excavate a gentle east-
west running ridge so as to build the new section of road at roughly the same grade as the road to 
the south of this point. Affidavit of Clinton Frederickson. (Clearwater County road employee) R 
pp. 102-107. 
In 1974, Wayne Johnson owned the property in Sections 26 and 27 on both sides of Three 
Bear Road. The Clearwater County Road Superintendent Wayne Johnson asked to execute a 
"RIGHT OF WAY DEED" with a description of two rectangular parcels 60 feet wide by a total 
of 1320 feet long. The description of the northern rectangle calls from the 1/4 comer common to 
Sections 26 and 27 to a point of beginning 20 feet West of said comer, then continues to describe 
a 60 foot wide by 300 foot long rectangle at an angle 9.5 degrees East of South. The southern 
parcel is described as a 60 foot wide by 1021 foot rectangle with 30 feet lying on each side of the 
Section line common to Sections 26 and 272• R pp. 99-100. 
By describing the location of the 60 foot wide right of way for the newly located Three 
Bear Road, as being a specific distance from the disputed 1/4 comer common to sections 26 and 
27, and assuming the existing road bed was in the center of the right of way, the described 
location of that comer can be determined today by measuring 50 feet east of the center of the 
road bed. R.C. Johnson recalls a cement monument in a location consistent with the Right of 
Way Deed-50 feet east of road center. Affidavit R.C. Johnson, p. 2, par. 4, R p. 90. 
In 1985, R.C. Johnson, grantee of the contiguous tract (Marek and Lawrence property) 
2 See, Exhibits "D", "E", "F", Affidavit of R. C. Johnson, R pp. 97-100. 
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from his father Wayne, conveyed to Laura Adamson the approximately 20 acres immediately 
west of Three Bear Road in Section 27, the east boundary of which is now in dispute. The legal 
description on the Warranty Deed3 reads as follows: 
"Sec 27, 38N, 1 W, El/2NESE, Less the S 36', and less 1.06 AC 
Road Right of Way in Sec 27, Recorded No. 108078." 
In 1985 Earl Lawrence was leasing the Section 26 ground east of Three Bear road from 
R.C. Johnson and cultivated it up to the boundary line he now asserts-parallel to Three Bear 
Road to a point near the north end of the property where the road turns to the west. From that 
point north, the cultivation line, if extended, would contact the north boundary line at or near a 
point 50 feet west of the center of Three Bear Road.4 In 1998 the Lawrences purchased the 
Section 26 property (Nl/2SW1/4) from R.C. Johnson with that aliquot part description.5 
In 2005 the Mareks hired a surveyor who located the subject north 1/4 comer common to 
said Sections 26 c.mc.l 27 significantly east of the cultivation line. R.C. Johnson attested that the 
access driveway from Three Bear Road to property now owned by the Mareks (adjacent and 
north of the subject Lawrence property in Section 26) lies east of where he believed the disputed 
l/4 corner to be.6 
3 Exhibit "G", Affidavit ofR. C. Johnson, R. 101. 
4 The cultivation line arcs to the east around an existing primitive driveway exiting Three 
Bear Road near the north end of the disputed boundary. See, Affidavit of R. C. Johnson, R pp. 90-
96 and Exhibit "C", thereto. 
5 A warranty deed with the same description from Johnson to the Lawrences was 
recorded in 2006. This is not in dispute. 
6 Johnson said this road was used by predecessors to the Mareks with his permission. 
This is a secondary access to the property from Three Bear Road. Affidavit of R. C. Johnson, p. 
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If the disputed north 1/4 comer is determined to be on the survey line, the Mareks will 
own the ground crossed by the driveway from Three Bear Road and a triangle shaped parcel of 
ground historically cultivated by the Lawrences. If the 1/4 corner is determined to be consistent 
with the Right of Way Deed from Wayne Johnson to Clearwater County and where R.C Johnson 
attested he understood the comer to be when he conveyed to Laura Adamson, the Lawrences will 
own the ground up to the approximate cultivation line, including the ground crossed by the 
driveway. 
IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court below first denied the Lawrences' motion for summary judgment 
based upon a conclusion that the deed from R.C. Johnson to Laura Adamson could be interpreted 
more than one way and questions of fact existed as to the intention of those parties to the 
transaction. The court reconsidered this decision and found the affidavits in support and 
opposition to summary judgment left no question of fact as to the intended location of the 
disputed boundary created when R.C. Johnson divided the 100 acre tract by his description of the 
20 acres he conveyed to Laura Adamson in 1985. 
In construing the record on a motion for summary judgment, all 
reasonable inferences and conclusions must be drawn in favor of 
the party opposing summary judgment.All doubts are to be 
resolved against the moving paiiy. The nonmoving party, however, 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's 
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or otherwise must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine 
issue of fact. The evidence offered in support of or in opposition 
3,4, par. 10., Rpp. 91, 92. 
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to a motion for summary judgment must be admissible. 
When questions of law are presented on a motion for summary 
j udgmenl, this Court exercises free review and is not bound by 
findings of the district court but is free to draw its own conclusions 
from the evidence presented .. Thus, the Court independently 
reviews the trial court's resolution of whether a genuine issue of 
material fact exists and whether the prevailing party was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. If uncontroverted facts exist which 
lead to a definite disposition as a matter oflaw, summary judgment 
is appropriate. (Citations omitted). 
Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841,216 P.3d 130 (Idaho 2009). 
V. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
The Mareks do not argue questions of material fact exist in this case. They 
contend the Johnson to Adamson deed is unambiguous and the grantor's intent as to the location 
of the boundary line created by that deed should be determined solely from the language of the 
deed. To consider extrinsic evidence was error by the lower court. 
At issue is whether the court may consider evidence other than the language of the legal 
description on this deed to determine the intent of the parties (Johnson/ Adamson) as to location 
of the disputed boundary. And if so, whether the evidence of record leaves no question of 
material fact as to the disputed boundary line being where Johnson and Adamson intended it to 
be. 
Also at issue is whether this appeal was frivolous and lacked merit sufficient to allow an 
award of attorney fees and costs on appeal as stated in lC § 12-121. 
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VI .. 
ARGUMENT 
As population of North Central Idaho increases, long existing tracts of rural land are now 
being divided. In some part due to the accuracy of modem equipment, surveyors are identifying 
boundary lines in locations at odds with long enduring occupation and use. Boundary law in 
Idaho has evolved to favor the owner who occupies, cultivates or improves property up to a line 
for a long period of time. Where a survey establishes a line inconsistent with usage, there must 
be an explanation. It is undisputed in this case that occupation and usage sprung from an 
understanding, which may also have been a mutual misunderstanding, of the location of the 
section line between Sections 26 and 27. 
A. Deed Construction/Mutual Mistake 
If the Johnson to Adamson deed were to be construed literally, two parcels of ground 60 
feet wide in Section 27 arguably now belong to R.C. Johnson7 in a location east of the Three 
Bear Road right of way. The legal description of the property conveyed to Adamson included 
the provision, "less the 1.06 Ac Road Right of Way in Sec 27 Recorded No 108078". The 
description of the strip of ground stated in said Right of Way Deed (No. 108078) calls from the 
disputed 1/4 comer and would place the strip in the Lawrences' wheat field if the surveyed 
comer controls. (See, Illustration, R p. 74, and Compare, Drawing by R.C. Johnson, R p. 97.) 
On its face this legal description is unambiguous. It is the survey which created the 
7 R.C. Johnson's father conveyed the Right Of Way Deed to Clearwater County by 
instrument recorded when he held only a life estate in the property. R.C Johnson was the 
remainderman. If the Wayne Johnson to Clearwater County Right of Way Deed expired on 
Wayne's death, R.C. Johnson is now the owner. 
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anomaly described above. When the description is placed on the ground it does not comport with 
the road center or the crop line extended. 8 
The tendency of modem decisions is to disregard technicalities and 
to treat all uncertainties in a conveyance as ambiguities subject to 
be cleared up by resort to the intention of the parties as gathered 
from the instrument itself, the circumstances attending and leading 
up to its execution, and the subject matter and the situation of the 
parties as of that time. 
In Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82, 245 P.2d 1052 (1952) an 
uncertain point of beginning rendered the deed ambiguous. There, 
as here, the use of a seemingly unambiguous description led to 
problems locating the parcel on the ground. Such uncertainty 
creates ambiguity. 
Allen v. Boydstun, 111 Idaho 188, 722 P.2d 497 (Idaho App. 1986). 
lt was the intent of R.C. Jolmson in 1985 to divide his property on the section line 
between Section 26 and 27. The location of the north comer of this line was identified in the 
deed to Adamson, by reference to a prior recorded Right of Way Deed, as being 50 feet east of 
the center of Three Bear Road. And according to his un-refuted Affidavit, a concrete monument 
marked the corner at that time. lf the survey here is accurate, the paiiies to the Johnson-
Adamson conveyance were mistaken as to the location of the subject section line. The disputed 
boundary line should be reformed to reflect the intent of the paiiies. Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 
636, 671 P.2d 1099 (Idaho App. 1983). 
8 In his affidavit Frank Marek asse1is the crop line does not extend to the north boundary, 
but follows the east arc line of the access road. R.C. Johnson explains the crop line if extended 
would correspond with his recollection of the location of the disputed corner; also in line with 
the Mareks' north-south fence running from that point to the north. See, Affidavit c~f R. C 
Johnson ( and Exhibit "C" thereto) R pp. 90-96). 
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B. Boundary by Agreement 
Property owners have historically agreed on the location of a boundary line between their 
properties when there has been no survey and they are uncertain as to the exact location of the 
line. 
The agreement establishing a boundary may be express or implied 
from the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties ... 
Allowing adjoining landowner, without objection, to build 
improvements on the property is also evidence of an agreement. 
The period of acquiescence need not continue f<)f the amount of 
time necessary to establish adverse possession because 
acquiescence is merely competent evidence of the agreement. 
Trappe ft v. Davis, 102 Idaho 527, 532, 633 P .2d 592, 597 (1981 ). 
Furthermore, we recently held that ignorance as to what is later 
deemed the true boundary constitutes the requisite uncertainty. 
Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho at 41, 794 P.2d at 630 
Morrissey v. Haley, 124 ldaho 870, 873, 865 P.2d 961, 965 (Idaho 1993) 
Most reported cases of boundary by agreement in Idaho arose from an implied agreement; 
use on one side of a line and acquiescence to such use by the owner on the other side of a line 
evidenced by a physical monument. A farming line has been held to be a sufficient monument. 
Grfffel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397, 34 P.3d 1080 (Idaho 2001). 
But here, the court need not consider the possibility that Lawrence's use and Marek's 
acquiescence was a product of convenience, not agreement, because the usage was consistent 
with an express boundary agreement. The legal description in the 1985 deed to Adamson, 
dividing R.C. Johnson's contiguous tract referred to a separate recorded instrument to identify 
the location of Three Bear Road. Laura Adamson ( or any subsequent owner) could refer to that 
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instrument and locate the disputed corner by measuring 50 feet east of the road center on a line 
with her north boundary line running east and west. 
A description contained in a deed will be sufficient so long as 
quantity, identity or boundaries of property can be determined from 
the face of the instrument, or by reference to extrinsic evidence to 
which it refers. 
Haney v. Molko, 123 Idaho 132, 844 P.2d 1382 (Ct.App.1992). 
Although they were possibly mistaken as to the true location of the section line dividing 
their properties, R.C. Johnson and Laura Adamson agreed on the location of their boundary. And 
the northern most point of that agreed boundary line was 50 feet east of the center of Three Bear 
Road. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
The Affidavit of R.C. Johnson, presented admissible evidence that Clearwater County 
asked his father to execute a right of way deed conveying a 60 food wide strip of ground to the 
county to reflect a realignment of Three Bear Road. The legal description of this strip called a 
point of beginning being a certain distance and bearing from the 1/4 comer now in dispute. 
According to the Affidavit of R.C. Johnson, this road right of way description was consistent 
with his understanding of the location of the disputed 1/4 comer, then evidenced by a concrete 
monument. He further attested that he and Laura Adamson agreed on that corner (50 feet east of 
road center) as the north point of the boundary line between the 20 acres he sold to her and the 80 
acres he retained and later sold to the Lawrences. 
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Again, we emphasize that the purpose of summary judgment 
proceedings is to eliminate the necessity of trial where facts are not 
in dispute and where existent and undisputed facts lead to a 
conclusion oflaw which is certain. Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 
337, 563 P.2d 395 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891, 98 S.Ct. 266, 
54 L.Ed.2d 177 (1977); Jacobsen v. State, 89 Wash.2d 104, 569 
P.2d 1152 (1977); see Hackin v. Rupp, 9 Ariz.App. 354, 452 P.2d 
519 (1969). If a party resists summary judgment, it is his 
responsibility to place in the record before the trial court the 
existence of controverted material facts which require resolution by 
trial. A party may not rely on his pleadings nor merely assert that 
there are some facts which might or will support his legal theory, 
but rather he must establish the existence of those facts by 
deposition, affidavit, or otherwise. Failure to so establish the 
existence of controverted material facts exposes a party to the risk 
of a summary judgment. We hold that such is the case here. 
Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441, 690 P .2d 896 (Idaho 1984) 
Here, the Mareks have presented no evidence of the intent of R.C. Johnson and Laura 
Adamson which would support placing the disputed boundary line in a location consistent with 
their survey-through the cultivated field. They rely solely on their assertion that the Johnson-
Adamson deed was and is unambiguous. This argument essentially asks the court to stTictly 
construe the first part of the legal description on the deed and ignore "less the 1.06 Ac ... " 
The description of"Boundary Number Two" in Judge Griffin's Judgment calls for a line 
running due north from its southern most point at the center of Three Bear Road. This may not 
result in the north comer of the disputed line being at a point consistent with the location 
identified in the 1985 deed from R.C. Johnson to Laura Adamson and the Affidavit of R.C. 
Johnson. The Respondents respectfully ask this court to affirm the District Court's decision in 
favor of the Lawrences and remand the case with instructions to revise the judgment to state the 
undisputed south corner of the boundary between the subject properties of the respective parties 
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is the center of Three Bear Road on a line with the south boundaries of the properties and the 
north comer is 50 feet east of center of Three Bear Road on a line with the north boundaries of 
the properties. 
The Lawrences further claim the additional attorney fees they have incurred to protect 
their property lines in this matter resulted from a frivolous appeal and they should therefore be 
awarded judgment for such expense pursuant to lC § 12-121. 
J,}h 
DATED this L day of October, 2011. 
I 
at:~-+--~-,-'-~"-----""---"--+h=-=--
Attorney for Respon ents 
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Paul Thomas Clark 
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